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Governance for Whom? Capturing the Inclusiveness and Unintended Effects of 
Governance
Jana Hönke, with Esther Thomas
Abstract
Research on governance by external non-state actors in areas of limited statehood con-
centrates on the conditions under which these actors engage in governance. However, this 
literature largely ignores findings from research on the anthropology of development, the 
privatization of security, and non-state welfare provision in developing countries that point 
to the limitations and negative effects of governance by non-state actors. Hence there are 
many reasons to distinguish carefully between different qualities of governance contributions 
and the (unintended) effects of external actors’ practices. This paper deals with the quality of 
governance in that it suggests an analytical framework for distinguishing different qualities 
along three dimensions: inclusiveness, the indirect effects of governance, and the external 
effects of non-governance practices. Empirically, the paper focuses on multinational com-
panies in sub-Saharan Africa. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the literature on business and 
governance noticeably isolates the positive contributions by firms from the negative effects 
of business activities in areas of limited statehood. Secondly, the case of companies – actors 
that do not aim at contributing to governance in the first place – clearly illustrates the added 
value of distinguishing different qualities of governance contributions. This is also relevant, 
however, for other governance actors. 
Zusammenfassung
Die Forschung zu Governance durch externe, nichtstaatliche Akteure in Räumen begrenzter 
Staatlichkeit konzentriert sich auf die Bedingungen, unter denen diese zur Bereitstellung 
kollektiver Güter beitragen. Dabei ignoriert sie bisher weitestgehend Ergebnisse der 
Entwicklungsanthropologie sowie der Literatur zu Sicherheitsprivatisierung und der nicht-
staatlichen Bereitstellung von Sozialleistungen, die die Grenzen und negativen Effekte von 
nichtstaatlicher Governance aufzeigen. Es lohnt sich für die Governance-Forschung, diese 
Ergebnisse ernst zu nehmen und unterschiedliche Qualitäten von Governance genauer 
in Augenschein zu nehmen. Dieses Papier beschäftigt sich mit ebenjenen qualitativen 
Unterschieden von Governance und entwirft einen analytischen Rahmen, mit dessen Hilfe 
diese entlang von drei Dimensionen erfasst werden können: Inklusivität von Governance, 
indirekte Effekte von Governance und externe Effekte von Praktiken, die nicht auf Beiträge 
zu Governance abzielen. Empirisch bezieht es sich auf multinationale Unternehmen in 
Subsahara Afrika. Dies einerseits, weil sich in der Literatur zu Unternehmen und Governance 
eine isolierte Betrachtung positiver Beiträge besonders virulent zeigt, ohne zwischen unter-
schiedlichen Qualitäten von Governance zu unterscheiden. Andererseits zeigen sich am Fall 
von Unternehmen, deren primäre Motivation nicht auf die Bereitstellung von Kollektivgütern 
in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit zielt, Probleme der Exklusivität und indirekter Effekte 
von Governance sowie negativer Externalitäten besonders eindrücklich. Eine Unterscheidung 
unterschiedlicher Qualitäten von Governance, die diese drei Aspekte berücksichtigt, ist aber 
auch für andere Governance-Akteure relevant.
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1. Introduction
In International Relations, research on private governance deals with companies as key actors.1 
Within much of this literature, as well as within political practice, companies are presented as 
resourceful and effective governance actors that are potentially able to close governance gaps 
in areas of limited statehood. Voluntary codes of conduct concerning companies’ social and 
security responsibilities are meant to make them contribute to collective goods provision at 
local production sites in these areas.2
Paradoxically, the literature on governance points to a credible shadow of hierarchy as a 
necessary incentive for such “good governance” behavior by firms (see Börzel 2010). In many 
areas in Africa, however, the state is not capable of stepping in when companies renege on their 
voluntary commitments. Mandatory state control is absent. Furthermore, companies’ home 
states have been reluctant to hold them accountable for what they do abroad. Literature on 
the political economy of state-business relations in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East 
argues that there is – at least when it comes to oil and mining companies – in fact a negative 
relationship between them operating in a country and the quality and inclusiveness of domestic 
governance (Ross 1999; Moore 2004). Finally, literature on the anthropology of development 
(Ferguson 1990; Murray Li 2007), the privatization of security (Daase/Friesendorf 2010; Leander 
2007; Kempa/Singh 2008), and the non-state welfare provision in developing countries (e.g. 
Cammett/MacLean 2011) points to the limitations and negative effects of governance by non-
state actors. There are therefore many reasons to look carefully at the different quality of such 
commitments and at the (unintended) effects of companies’ practices.
This paper deals with such differences in the quality of governance contributions by non-state 
actors. Governance is defined here as contributing to rules and institutions that are apt to 
improve the collective good (Gemeinwohl) or as providing collective goods. Going beyond the 
question of under what conditions do companies contribute to governance, this paper outlines an 
analytical framework for distinguishing different qualities of governance outcomes. Currently, 
the literature on business and governance does not distinguish between different degrees 
of inclusiveness in governance contributions. It also largely ignores how the attempt to “do 
good” may actually have serious negative side effects. Finally, it isolates the study of companies’ 
contributions to the collective good from the whole range of companies’ actions, including 
the negative effects or externalities of their private activities on collectivities. We argue that the 
1 We would like to thank Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Virginia Haufler, Tanja Börzel, Andreas Olden-
bourg, Daniel Jacob, and the participants of the SFB 700 Jour Fixe, the ISA 2011 panel on CSR and Go-
vernance in Developing Countries, and of the panel “Governance for whom” at the SFB conference in 
May 2011 for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. This paper is the result of the research 
project “Business and Local Governance in sub-Saharan Africa” that is part of Research Center (SFB) 
700 “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood” at Freie Universität Berlin (the project outline can be 
found at http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/teilprojekte/projektbereich_d/d2/project/index.html). We 
are also grateful to the German Research Foundation (DFG) for its financial support.
2 The term “governance“ in this paper follows the definition of the SFB 700: governance is the various 
institutionalized modes of social coordination that produce and implement collectively binding rules, 
or that provide collective goods (Framework proposal SFB 700 2009).
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various different qualities of governance contributions need to be distinguished by looking at 
three specific dimensions: inclusiveness, the indirect effects of governance, and the external 
effects of core business practices. In order to offset the bias in the business and governance 
literature toward positive business contributions to governance, we focus on the negative 
indirect effects and externalities of business practices. A nuanced evaluation of companies’ role 
in governance requires a (re)consideration of the “dark sides” of non-state actors’ practices. 
To illustrate our analytical categories, we draw on evidence from multinational mining 
companies in Tanzania, South Africa, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
focusing on the nexus of security and development practices by firms. We discuss how different 
dimensions of the quality of governance and the negative externalities of business practices 
relate to each other in a single case study. This illustrates what the framework proposed in 
this paper helps to reveal that is so far overlooked in the governance literature (see also Börzel/
Hönke 2011).
Why are these issues relevant for governance research more generally? The scope of non-state 
governance – whether in cooperation with the state or whether acting without the state – is 
often territorially and functionally limited. It occurs at a sub-national level and/or is limited 
to particular issue areas, such as labor rights, environmental issues, and security. When non-
state actors claim authority over several functional areas, this remains mostly restricted to 
geographically limited sub-national spaces or narrowly defined identity groups. In all these 
cases, “governance for whom” is thus an open empirical question that is often highly contested. 
Relevant research questions in this regard are thus: Who is excluded from non-state governance 
attempts? What are the effects of governance for a functionally, socially, or territorially specific 
collectivity on other collectivities? What are the effects of the pluralization of governance actors 
on governance by government? The findings from our cases are relevant for the study of other 
for-profit actors in governance. However, they also provide comparable insight for research on 
the different qualities and effects of other actors and forms of non-state governance. 
In the following, we first review the governance literature with regard to these questions and 
then conceptualize the inclusiveness of governance, the negative effects of governance, and 
the negative externalities of business practices. In order to illustrate these three concepts with 
empirical examples, we draw on security and development practices of mining companies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Using the case of a Canadian gold-mining company in Guinea, we finally 
demonstrate how using these different categories makes us see governance outcomes differently: 
the proposed framework brings different collectivities that benefit or suffer from a company’s 
governance activities to our attention. We conclude by summarizing our main arguments and 
by discussing the broader political consequences of the pluralization of governance. 
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2. Governance for (and against) whom? Gaps in the governance literature
The governance literature in International Relations has several blind spots. Firstly, it is 
narrowly focused on formalized governance arrangements. In a top-down manner, research 
focuses on policy commitments and institutional design at the global level (see also Börzel/
Hönke 2011). The literature concentrates, secondly, on well-intentioned initiatives for collective 
goods provision (Kaul 2003; Haufler 2001; Wenger/Möckli 2003). It concentrates on the question 
of under which conditions business may contribute to collective goods provision. A number of 
blind spots result from these biases. 
There is not much interest in distinguishing the different qualities of governance outcomes. 
Rather, the literature poses questions like under what conditions do single non-state actors 
choose to contribute to collective goods? Or how do a plurality of actors overcome collective 
action problems to produce public goods despite market failure (Cornes/Sandler 1989; Héritier 
2002)? The debate thus discusses which incentives motivate companies to commit to governance. 
In this respect, much of the business and governance literature points to the importance of a 
credible shadow of hierarchy. This, however, leads to a paradox when these arguments travel 
from the context of new modes of governance in the “coordination state” to areas of limited 
statehood (Mayntz 2005). In many cases, the state is not capable of stepping in when companies 
renege on their voluntary commitments and mandatory state control is absent (Börzel 2010). 
However, companies commit to collective goods provision without a state shadow of hierarchy. 
Alternative explanatory factors range from local actor constellations and the properties of the 
goods to be produced, to an external shadow of hierarchy, market incentives, and normative and 
cultural factors (Börzel/Risse 2010; Börzel/Thauer forthcoming; Prakash/Potoski 2006). 
Instead of focusing on the motivations and collective action problems of non-state actors 
engaging in governance, however, we are interested in the different outcomes of non-state 
governance. The (global) governance debate has addressed the problem of inclusiveness by 
distinguishing public goods provision from the provision of private goods (e.g., Kaul 2003). 
Public goods are defined as non-excludable and non-rival, whereas private goods are the 
opposite: excludable and rival in consumption. Common or club goods are in between, defined 
as non-rival in consumption but with a mechanism of exclusion in place (Cornes/Sandler 1989). 
From a global perspective, most governance – state and non-state – is governance for clubs; 
from this perspective, the citizens of nation states are simply a bigger club than the members 
of a local community (Heritier 2002). 
Drawing on this classification of goods in economic theory, “public” and “private” refer to the 
technical characteristics of particular goods. However, these characteristics of a good (non-rival, 
non-excludable) are only naturally given for purely public goods. Most governance we look at 
in areas of limited statehood is very political. There are many contested issues for example who 
is being governed, who should benefit from a particular good provided by a non-state actor, 
and who could legitimately be excluded from accessing it? Further, who is defined as part of 
a governance collectivity? How many people are negatively affected by that same governance 
Governance for Whom? |  8
attempt? And for negative externalities of business activity that are not addressed, whom 
does such non-governance negatively affect? Evaluating the quality of companies’ governance 
contributions requires taking these different collectivities into account. 
Regarding the different qualities of non-state governance outcomes, the literature on compliance 
and on governance effectiveness examines the level of implementation of governance attempts 
to some extent. However, the problem with this literature is for one that it limits itself to looking 
at outputs (e.g., programs, policies within companies, and new administrative structures). It 
examines neither the outcome of transnational governance initiatives nor their overall impact 
(Börzel/Hönke 2011). Following the policy cycle, studies look at the role of business in agenda-
setting and decision-making, policy formulation, and output. Few go further and examine 
whether there are actual changes in behavior compliant with the policy and who actually receives 
or benefits from a particular contribution to governance (Raustiala/Slaughter 2002). There often 
is an important gap between policy commitment and actual outcomes of such policy. This issue 
needs more attention in research on non-state governance. 
However, the gap in this literature goes beyond a lack of a systematic assessment of actual 
policy outcomes. The second issue not much addressed is if – and to what extent – governance 
attempts by business contribute to solving the broader problem that is claimed to be addressed 
(Miles et al. 2002). What do we know about the extent to which a governance contribution by 
a company is effectively contributing to solving the problem that a particular initiative was 
created to address in the first place? A high level of compliance with voluntary transnational 
governance and private codes of conduct does not say much about the degree of the overall 
problem-solving effectiveness of such programs (Beisheim et al. 2008; Raustiala/Slaughter 
2002). 
It can be argued, thirdly, that private governance actors may turn out to be more likely to 
pursue specialized, private interests and that they are not very accountable to those affected 
by their actions. This makes exclusive forms of governance more likely (Held/McGrew 2002: 
14). Criminologists Singh and Kempa, for instance, show for South Africa that the rise of 
commercial security increased a fragmented and selective distribution of security. Effective 
governance for and within clubs is detached from broader social and economic peace (Kempa/
Singh 2008). Overall, the governance literature tells us little about the unintended and negative 
effects of non-state actors’ governance practices. In fact, it largely ignores the de facto side 
effects governance attempts have whether they are effective or in effective (Hönke forthcoming). 
As has been suggested in the case of environmental governance (Young 2004), the consequences 
on other governance arrangements in the same thematic area should be considered as well as 
the systemic effects on governance outcomes in other thematic areas. 
Finally, the negative externalities of business practices need to be brought back into governance 
research, such as environmental degradation and the fuelling of conflict, corruption, and 
authoritarian governance by governments. A number of studies point to the collectivities 
negatively affected by non-governance or not-good-enough (too exclusive and superficial) 
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governance by companies (see e.g., Nest et al. 2006; Ballentine/Sherman 2003; Frynas 2001; Ross 
1999; Reno 2001). Even where there is evidence for a company’s contribution to collective goods 
provision in a particular issue area and locality, this needs to be assessed in light of the negative 
effects of governance and the negative externalities of the other business practices by the same 
company. 
3. Different qualities and “unintended” effects of governance – toward an analytical 
framework
In order to move governance research forward – beyond looking at companies’ commitments 
to governance and assessing the extent to which governance actors comply with the rules 
they committed themselves to – in this section we develop analytical categories to distinguish 
between different qualities of private governance outcomes. Our starting point is to consider the 
entire range of governance practices at the local level and contradictions and conflict between 
different governance attempts and collectivities. We conceptualize and distinguish between 
different dimensions of inclusiveness and unintended negative effects of governance attempts 
by companies, as well as of negative externalities of core business practices. This framework 
allows us to distinguish between different qualities of non-state governance and to build on 
these distinctions, specifying the preconditions for circumstances where companies – or other 
non-state actors – contribute to more or less desirable governance outcomes.
3.1 Inclusiveness of governance contributions 
In a study about inclusive governance, the United Nations Development Program defines 
inclusiveness as a normative goal:
“To be inclusive is a core value of democratic governance, in terms of equal 
participation, equal treatment and equal rights before the law. This implies that all 
people – including the poor, women, ethnic and religious minorities, indigenous 
peoples and other disadvantaged groups – have the right to participate meaningfully 
in governance processes and influence decisions that affect them. It also means that 
governance institutions and policies are accessible, accountable and responsive to 
disadvantaged groups, protecting their interests and providing diverse populations 
with equal opportunities for public services such as justice, health and education.” 
(UNDP 2007: 1)
This definition lays out two important criteria for inclusive governance: inclusive participation 
in decision-making and the inclusiveness of governance outcomes. Research on governance by 
non-state actors has largely focused on the first criterion. This paper, in contrast, focuses on 
the second. It asks questions like how are governance problems defined (narrow/broadly) and, 
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as a result, whom does governance formally address? Who actually benefits from governance 
outcomes and who is excluded?
At the heart of the problem of governance inclusiveness is the notion of the collectivity. In 
state-centric analyses, the citizens enclosed by state boundaries constitute the collectivity that 
governance by governments ought to be directed at. However, in many cases of governance 
without government, there is no clear definition of what the relevant governance collectivity 
should be. This has become a core problem of political theory (see Ladwig et al. 2011). The 
approach here is to turn the problem into an empirical question and to propose an analytical 
framework that allows us to systematically integrate this problem into empirical research on 
non-state governance. 
One option to approach this task would be to find abstract criteria for who is entitled to be part 
of a governance collectivity. However, who is entitled to benefit from non-state governance is 
not an easy question to define a priori and according to abstract criteria. The simplest criterion 
for inclusion would be membership. Individuals can be members of a particular organization 
or identity group. Membership gives rights vis-à-vis an organization, and entitlement to receive 
services from that organization. When researching governance by companies, the inclusiveness 
of governance contributions could be assessed on the basis of all citizens being entitled to 
benefit. This would be the case if we defined a governance collectivity as a group comprised of all 
rights-bearing citizens of the state in which a company engages in governance (Stichweh 2009). 
Yet, membership could be defined not in relation to the state but instead to the company. In 
this case, however, full inclusiveness of governance would already be attained if the employees 
of a company were addressed. Thus both definitions are not very useful empirically. In many 
places, citizen rights are neither recognized nor lived in practice. Non-state governors rarely 
engage in the governance of entire nations. Simultaneously, local communities negatively 
affected by non-state governance – or the absence thereof – are not members of, for instance, a 
company, which would allow them to make claims on that basis. Looking at governance by non-
state actors in areas of limited statehood, the object of research largely falls in between the two 
collectivities defined through membership. 
Instead of starting with an a priori definition of the nature of a governance contribution (a 
good) or with a particular group of people for whom collective goods should be provided 
(citizens, the members of an organization), we suggest starting from a particular governance 
actor (a company in our case). Two measures of how inclusive governance is stand out, namely 
the claimed and the actual scope of collective goods provision by an actor. Scope refers to both 
geographical and social reach: which geographical areas are addressed and where governance is 
actually implemented; and who governance addresses versus who actually receives or benefits 
from governance (see also Benecke et al. 2008). 
From a governmentality and sociology of law perspective, we learn that social and geographical 
in/exclusion are not the same and should be analytically distinguished (Rose 1999; Valverde 
2008; Opitz 2007). Castells and other proponents of the inequality literature merge these two 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 31 • May 2012  |  11
different dimensions of exclusion by using metaphors of ex-territoriality, such as “black holes,” 
“ghettos,” and the representation of Africa as the “excluded continent” (Castells 1996). While 
there are ghettos and gated communities, social and geographical exclusion do not always go 
hand in hand, however (Opitz 2007: 44). Through a company’s community practices, one can 
understand the relevance of distinguishing addressees from recipients of governance, and 
similarly distinguishing geographical from social scope in this regard. 
Take, for instance, the multinational gold-mining company Semafo. Based in Guinea, Semafo 
claims in public presentations that they consider neighboring communities to be the addressees 
of their community-relations efforts. However, the community projects run by the company 
are not evenly distributed across the villages affected by its mining operations but are rather 
geographically concentrated in the villages of Kiniero and Balan. Kiniero and Balan are the 
closest villages to the company’s mining sites and to the company’s administration buildings; 
Kiniero is also the place where the company encounters the most protests and trouble. The 
social scope of Semafo’s community relations is also selective. Projects address specific social 
groups, in particular youth and elders. In 2009, the company’s social donations concerned 
elders of Kiniero in particular. They gave sheep and jewelry to the imam and two elders of 
Kiniero village. They funded a trip to Mecqua for the wise men of Kiniero in 2005. They also 
transported students to an exam center and built a youth center. The geographical and social 
scope in this case reveals two possible limitations of companies’ governance attempts: they 
might be geographically limited and within these limits they might benefit only certain groups 
of people. Therefore, inclusiveness needs to be measured alongside social and geographical 
criteria.
The sociological literature on inclusion and exclusion offers further ways to describe the 
inclusiveness of governance. In sociological debates about poverty and inequality in (post)
industrialized, (post)welfare states in Europe and North America, exclusion is understood as 
exclusion from income opportunities (work, welfare). Such exclusion from economic exchange 
is seen as leading to exclusion from other social systems (Kronauer 2002). Poverty and exclusion 
are, however, more complex phenomena. The mechanisms that define people as “ignored” and 
as outsiders of “normal” society are much broader than merely economic criteria: excluded 
are also those who experience powerlessness, who are not part of a social system, and who 
suffer communicative isolation (Farzin 2006: 63). System-theoretical approaches emphasize the 
non-material aspects of exclusion, putting the idea of “chances to communicate” at the center 
of exclusion analysis (Farzin 2006: 64). Important to consider in a postcolonial context is, in 
addition, the concurrence of different social structuring principles: rational-bureaucratic logics 
and codes coexist with sustained organizational principles different from Western rational-
bureaucratic modernity (“incomplete inclusion,” see Stichweh 2005). Inclusion in one social 
system or discursive field may thus entail not only exclusion from another. It also takes place 
within and between different functional systems in societies – local, national, global – as well as 
within and between transnational and local social systems (see also Farzin 2006: 85). 
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In addition to criteria for the scope of governance contributions, we suggest examining the 
qualitative experience of governance (e.g., Cammett/MacLean 2011: 9). One aspect of how 
governance contributions are perceived is how people evaluate the type and quality of goods 
they receive. Another is to examine whether the local population perceives the scope and 
distribution of governance by the company as fair and inclusive, or as unequal and exclusionary 
(Cammett/MacLean 2011: 9). On the first point, the case of a gold-mining company in Tanzania 
is illustrative. In the Shinyanga region, there is a clear example of the gap between a seemingly 
positive social policy outcome (compensation for displacement) and its questionable positive 
impact. Barrick Gold’s Buzwagi mine had to resettle an entire village in order to dig a mining 
pit and constructed a whole new village, presenting it as a positive effort toward the local 
community and promising significantly upgraded replacement homes. However, it turns out 
these new houses were not appropriate to the way of life of the people who were going to live 
in them.3 The families were polygamists, often composed of a man and at least four wives and 
six kids. Meanwhile, the new houses had only two rooms and a small amount of unfertile land, 
leaving no place for families’ cattle. Asking about local perceptions gives an idea of whether 
governance contributions are adapted to the actual problems and needs of those addressed by 
programs, or if, for instance, corporate social investments are detached from local needs.
There is a second point about different perceptions of governance contributions, and thus a 
second measure for crosschecking the claims governance actors make themselves with local 
perceptions. Public debates about “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) in Tanzania and 
Guinea illustrate that often, competing views exist of what is considered as equal distribution 
of, for instance, the economic benefits of multinational gold-mining companies. In Guinea, 
companies’ tax payments are directly deposited into a special account for public investments 
in the mining area where they have their operations. A local state agency is in charge of these 
particular localities and handles the management of the money through participative forums 
at the village, district, and regional levels. General opinion has it that all tax money should 
legitimately go back to the locality next to the mine. On the contrary, in Tanzania the general 
view is that all tax payments should be redistributed equally throughout the country. In this 
view, the mining company should have to deal with the specific problems of local communities 
that are related to the presence of the mines as a separate issue from their taxes. Socially 
situated actors in time- and place-specific contexts thus define very differently what is actually 
considered as the adequate group of addressees and what as equal distribution.
The figure below summarizes the different dimensions and indicators of the degrees and 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of governance that can be drawn from the discussion 
of the literature above. 
3 Interview with a consultant on natural resource management and controversial journalist, 2 April 2011, 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
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Figure 1
Inclusiveness of governance by companies
The geographical scope of governance The social scope of governance
Designated area Actual spatial reach Addressees Actual recipients
Qualitative experience of governance 
Perceived as inclusive and equal or as exclusive and unequal
3.2 Unintended effects of governance
So far, we have discussed the different degrees of the inclusiveness of collective goods provision 
by companies. This has included questions of who is being addressed and/or actually benefits 
from corporate governance contributions, and who is excluded from these benefits. We will 
now go a step further and consider how such governance for a particular group of recipients 
may turn out to be governance against others. We ask a question rarely asked in the governance 
literature: How might “doing good” turn out to be “doing bad”? In other words, what are the 
negative effects of governance arrangements in practice? 
We do this to evaluate the inclusiveness of governance not from within a governance initiative 
(whom does it address or reach), but from the external criterion of who else might be negatively 
affected by the initiative (for a summary, see figure 2, p. 16). Whereas the governance literature 
deals with the non-compliance of companies with voluntary standards, there is very little about 
the “unintended” negative consequences of governance (for an exception, see Daase/Friesend-
orf 2010).4 Transnational and local private- and multi-stakeholder governance initiatives, as well 
as company activities under the label of CSR, have negative consequences themselves. That is, 
they affect local social goods provision and (in)security in ways that are not foreseen in these 
policies. They may be unintended by the individuals who negotiate and/or implement a par-
ticular policy, however, since we are not mind readers and thus do not know what their “true” 
intentions are, “unintended” simply refers to the intentions as expressed in a policy.5
A first unintended consequence of non-state governance is that their governance contribu-
tions often operate with a narrow definition of a problem and a narrow scope of recipients, as 
opposed to a broader framing of problems and potential solutions that could also be possible. 
Such narrow and superficial policy approaches might be the result of the “hijacking” of agen-
das by companies (for other interest groups see Clifford 2010). Companies may more or less 
openly lobby for setting a narrow agenda in order to avoid additional costs. Multilateral part-
4 Concentrating on negative effects and negative unintended consequences introduces a certain nega-
tive bias. This is intentionally so, since it addresses a gap in the business and governance literature. 
Positive unintended consequences are at the core of liberal economic theory: it is argued that the un-
coordinated, individual search for a maximal profit in the market will create more welfare for all.
5 For a different approach, see Daase/Friesendorf (2010: 9).
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nerships or local voluntary initiatives may only reflect the smallest common denominator (see 
also Daase/Friesendorf 2010). Instead of proposing a comprehensive and sustainable solution 
to a problem, such initiatives may settle upon the smallest common denominator, rendering 
the definition of a problem as well as the scope and depth of envisaged governance measures 
distorted and narrow. This is illustrated by what an interviewee in Tanzania stated about cor-
porate governance contributions. According to him, corporate provision of welfare services is 
more about “who do you silence” than it is about developing inclusive governance at the local 
level.6 Companies give something where they feel conflicts are rising. In addition, governance 
initiatives are often geographically and functionally very specific so that a comprehensive solu-
tion of complex problems is unlikely. For public-private partnerships (PPPs), it has been argued 
that “the narrow focus of PPPs on specific governance problems may be beneficial in terms of 
simple performance, but could provoke negative side-effects, and thus, could be dysfunctional 
in terms of complex performance” (Schäferhoff et al. 2009: 22). 
Beyond agenda setting, a second group of unintended consequences of governance interven-
tions are the effects external governance has on local politics. Conflict may arise, for instance, 
as a result of companies’ well-intended development programs. In many cases, certain people 
and groups benefit from such programs and others do not. Some people may gain in power and 
autonomy from local elites through cooperation with the company whereas others might lose 
influence and authority. Contributions to local social service provision by gold-mining com-
pany AngloGold in Tanzania, for instance, was spent strategically on specific communities in 
which chiefs or politicians had close collaborative ties with that company (Lange 2006).
However, an important part of these unintended effects of governance arises during the imple-
mentation process: implementation can be incomplete due to a lack of resources or political 
will. Implementation might be poorly managed and insensitive to the local political and social 
context. This can be the case because companies contract out the provision of a particular se-
curity and development task to actors who do not have the appropriate training and/or equip-
ment. Programs might also be appropriated and used differently from what was proscribed in 
the policy with problematic effects. Such misappropriation can result from the lack of political 
oversight and transparency of these programs (Schroeder 2010). For these or other reasons, 
there is ample evidence for how local power structures change strategies and influence the al-
location of money and goods in a partial way (see for instance the literature on the anthropology 
of development, such as Mosse/Lewis 2005). Non-state governance thus often perpetuates, or 
even aggravates, social and political inequality. Sometimes it does more harm than good.
In the case of the Guinean village of Kiniero for instance, where the mining company Semafo 
operates, local politics are affected because of privileged relations the company has with state 
authorities at all levels. Semafo maintains close ties with local government officials and pro-
vides them with personal favors. It maintains the sous-prefect’s vehicle, the prefect used to come to 
6 Interview with a member of the Agency for Cooperation and Research Development (ACORD), April 8 
2011, Mwanza, Tanzania.
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Semafo’s facilities every weekend for shelter and food plus “an envelope.”7 There were also regu-
lar visits from national ministries and the provincial governor for similar amenities. According 
to an NGO representative, these visits by officials did not translate in improved collective goods 
provision by the state to the local population. When villagers affected by Semafo’s operations 
tried to address them with their problems, the authorities responded that they did not have 
the time. The smallest local government structure in the area, the local development commit-
tee at village level, complained about Semafo not consulting them when problems arise.8 The 
company thus effectively uses the engagement with provincial and central state authorities to 
sideline local representatives of the population affected by mining and to delegitimate local 
critique and requests. 
A third unintended consequence is that conflict may arise within and between communities 
over access to particular governance programs. A fundamental question in this regard is what 
kinds of communities get constructed. As neither nation state nor organizational boundaries 
define the people who should legitimately expect, and should have the right to request, services 
from the company, these boundaries are fluid and under constant negotiation. There is an im-
portant literature, mostly in political anthropology and the sociology of rule, which deals with 
the construction of identity groups related to the negotiation of access to resources in local 
arenas (Peluso 2009; Watts 2004). If we understand political topographies not as fixed but rather 
as outcomes of dynamic processes of constructing territorial and social spaces, the inclusive-
ness of governance should not only be assessed in terms of scope. How spaces and collectivities 
have been constructed becomes an equally relevant question (see Rose 1999 on the making of 
governable spaces and the creation of zones of exception). People become marginalized in local 
society because they oppose the company whereas other powerful actors do not. 
Finally, and this is a more general point, non-state governance may reduce the ability of the 
state to provide for public goods.9 Instead of complementing governance by the state, non-state 
governance may rather substitute for it. Substitution may undermine state capacities to deliver 
collective goods by the simple fact that it is no longer necessary (see also Wood 1997; Cammett/
MacLean 2011). Another mechanism weakening state capacities to govern is that companies and 
international organizations compete with state administration over human capital at the local 
levels of implementation. Since these external actors are able to pay higher wages than the state, 
well-educated and effective staff are regularly recruited away from the public into the private or 
external development sector. 
7 Interview with the leader of an NGO from Kouroussa region who works on conflicts at the local level, 
February 28, 2011, Kouroussa, Guinea.
8 Interview with the CRD representatives February 27, 2011, Kiniero, Guinea. CRD stands for Commune 
Rural de Development (rural development commune), the smaller unit of state decentralization.
9 For discussion of this argument in the context of the transformation of European welfare states see 
e.g., Offe (2009).
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Figure 2
Unintended effects of governance
“Hijacking” of agenda – imposition of narrow problem definition
On local politics – Perpetuate local inequalities
On local collective goods provision (security)
Increased insecurity for non-members of 
the “club”
Increased conflict between groups
On governance by state
Crowding out Indirect discharge
Contrary to arguments that interpret the increasing role of private actors in contemporary 
governance as a sign of the weakening power of central state authorities, however, the extend-
ed role of corporate entities in governance can also be understood as a new form of “indi-
rect discharge.”10 Here, governments quasi-outsource local governance to companies and use 
company governance to regain or strengthen control over regions and revenues from mining, 
thereby ensuring regime survival (Hönke 2010). Looking at cases such as the Democratic Re-
public of Congo, the indirect discharge argument holds that states strategically use the engage-
ment of external non-state actors to retreat from certain state functions. Discharge can work in 
very indirect ways. Instead of direct delegation, indirect mechanisms make companies take up 
governance functions: the discourse of corporate responsibility and private authority, and the 
(sometimes strategic) absence of the state from providing collective goods. Through strategic 
absence, host states indirectly discharge the management of local grievances and conflict to 
companies, such as in the mining regions in Southern DRC or in the new gold-mining region 
in the northwest of Tanzania. 
3.3 Negative externalities of core business practices 
Let us turn from the inclusiveness and unintended effects of governance attempts by compa-
nies to the externalities of their core business practices. The quality of governance contribu-
tions by a company, we hold, also needs to be assessed in light of the effects of a company’s 
non-governance activities. Aid organizations are considered to intervene in areas of limited 
statehood primarily to provide collective goods. A mining company’s outright mission is, how-
ever, to extract non-renewable resources from a territory in order to make a profit. Companies 
often do not even claim that their purpose was to directly contribute to the public good. In 
10 Max Weber originally used this concept to describe a technique of rule used in empires and feudal sta-
tes that works through the delegation of coercive and extractive authority from central rulers to local 
power holders (1980: 580-623). In reaction to the privatization policies implemented since the 1980s, 
discharge has reemerged as a means of consolidating the power of the central state through delegating 
state functions to non-state business actors while indirectly keeping control over the private sector 
(Hibou 1999).
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many cases, critics hold these operations are not compatible with such a goal. While the busi-
ness and governance literature has found positive examples for collective goods provision by 
companies (Haufler 2001; Börzel/Thauer forthcoming), the problem remains that such studies 
tend to isolate contributions to “good” governance from the negative externalities of compa-
nies’ business activities in areas of limited statehood (Hönke forthcoming; Börzel/Hönke 2011). 
Therefore, contributions to governance by companies in one area – often not directly related to 
the core business of the company – need to be considered in light of negative external effects of 
other company practices often related to their core business. 
Economists define negative externalities as the spillover of the costs of an economic activity 
on unrelated third parties. Concerning mining companies, typical examples for such negative 
externalities are the various forms of serious environmental pollution deriving from the pro-
duction process, such as polluted water, water scarcity, the loss of agricultural land or dust. In 
the case of security, asset protection aiming at providing security for the company as a private 
good has negative effects upon collective security in an area. Why are the negative effects of 
these practices relevant for assessing the quality of governance? We draw here on two normative 
criteria suggested by Ladwig et al. (2011) to determine to whom companies may have moral du-
ties. These authors argue that companies have a responsibility for all those negatively affected 
by their operations and to all those subjected to their power. 
The point here is that in order to protect the private property of the mine, for instance, compa-
nies draw on practices that not only exclude the public, but that also negatively affect security 
as a public good. Chasing peasants off their land or bribing local authorities may increase the 
private security of the company but it decreases the security of others. The increased number of 
security agents in the service of multinational mining companies in Tanzania and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, for instance, has led to an increase in violent encounters between 
local populations and security forces (see paragraph below). Furthermore, no provision or the 
insufficient provision of rules to reduce negative externalities on those communities affected 
by corporate practices (re)produces public ill. The same can be said of the fact that there is no 
inclusive provision or there is insufficiently inclusive provision of collective goods to these 
communities. No governance is actually against people in the case of negative externalities of 
companies’ private activities. 
The dimension of externalities thus introduces a third layer against which to evaluate the in-
clusiveness (and quality) of governance by companies. Concerning mining companies, typical 
examples for such negative externalities are various forms of environmental pollution. Nega-
tive externalities in the social domain are increased migration, various social problems such 
as prostitution, and an increase in HIV/AIDS infections. Companies, by their simple presence, 
physically change the area in which they operate and have direct consequences on local people’s 
everyday lives. As an example, since Semafo arrived in the village of Kiniero, the area has been 
strongly affected by red dust coming from the mining activities. It spreads everywhere in the 
surrounding villages, covering houses and roads, cattle, people’s hair, and clothes. It causes 
breathing problems and sickness, especially for children and the elderly. In the same area, a 
Governance for Whom? |  18
road was cut to force villagers to pass in front of the military camp and be checked as they leave 
the mining zone. Do the core activities of mining companies affect the surrounding areas more 
broadly than their governance responses do?
In the domain of local security governance, the protection of companies’ assets – that is, the 
provision of security as a private good – has serious negative effects on local collective security. 
In the DRC, for instance, Anglogold Ashanti in Eastern Congo and Anvil Mining in the Cop-
perbelt in Southern Congo deploy large numbers of private and state security agents. Roads and 
fields are rendered inaccessible because of patrols and road blockages. More security personnel 
in these areas has led to an increase in violent encounters between local residents and security 
forces (NIZA/IPIS 2006; Kobler 2011). In addition, local people and a large migrant population 
have lived from artisanal mining in both areas since the breakdown of the formal mining in-
dustry with the beginning of the Congolese wars in 1996–1997. They are now chased off from 
concessions, without being given alternative means of generating income (Hönke 2010). 
Another example comes from Tanzania, where the presence and security strategy of the mul-
tinational mining company Barrick Gold increased insecurity in North Mara region. Violent 
encounters in 2009 had increased and were analyzed as being linked to the sharp rise of gold 
prices (almost threefold in the past five years). The company asked the government to establish 
a special federal police force in the region. According to informants, the establishment of this 
special police was meant to secure the company and its relationship with the state, not to secure 
the people. Indeed, it seems that consequently the special police force only gets very selectively 
involved in security provision, as it usually operates exclusively for and gets its directives from 
Barrick Gold. There are frequent reports of violent incidents that involve security actors associ-
ated with the company.11
Other such negative externalities are that certain people and groups benefit more than others 
from jobs, contracts, investment in their jurisdiction, or bribes. Some people may be particu-
larly negatively affected by land loss, loss of income, or the excesses of mine security guards. 
Companies often collaborate with, and thereby strengthen, one faction that then strengthens 
that faction’s power over others. Politicians, in turn, use the capital earned through close col-
laboration with the company against others (see case study by von Hellerman 2010). Anthro-
pologist Marianna Welker (2009) gives an excellent example for the stability- and status-quo-
oriented nature of corporate governance engagement at the local level. In the case of the US-
based company Freeport McMoRan, one of the world’s largest producers of industrial metals, 
she traces how the company turned toward adopting CSR norms and introducing extensive 
community-engagement policies after having been heavily criticized for human rights abuses 
in the 1990s (Abrash 2002). Welker shows how, despite a number of changes in the company’s 
11 Interview with a member of an NGO from Musoma (in the North Mara region) working on Tanzani-
an mining areas, April 7, 2011, Mwanza, Tanzania. The Wall Street Journal reports security personnel 
shooting intruders, protests, clashes with protesters, villagers invading and stopping the mine for 
thirty-seven hours on January 31, 2011; after deployment of twenty-five paramilitary police guards, 
confrontations with locals increased and there have been a number of shootings; Wall Street Journal, 
December 3, 2009 [last accessed 17.02.2010].
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 31 • May 2012  |  19
community policies at operations in Indonesia, Freeport sides with the traditional, conserva-
tive forces in order to fend off critique and demands by progressive, environmental groups at 
the local level. In a different form, we found such exclusive, client-oriented strategies (those 
that foster benefits for a club against the broader collectivity) in the Geita District in Tanzania. 
Members of parliament in Geita are co-opted by the company, and some leaders are provided 
with fuel for free and other material gifts.12 Furthermore, in the North Mara region of Tanzania, 
local representatives up to the district level have allegedly been put in place with the help of 
Barrick Gold. The company seems to have funded their political campaigns in order to place 
pro-Barrick representatives in public positions in order to facilitate the companies’ access to 
prospecting and acquiring land.13
These cases show that we need to take the political economy in which governance contributions 
by companies take place into account. How do multinational companies, and transnational 
governance interventions more generally, affect accumulation structures and power at the lo-
cal level (Peluso 2009)? The single most important issue in this regard is the question of land. 
Territory in most parts of Africa is controlled “both for its economic value and as a source of 
leverage over other people” (Berry 2009: 24). Giving contracts over large concessions to mining 
companies – as fostered by external economic reforms since the 1980s – has increased local 
competition over land. In Tanzania, as well as in Guinea, for instance, custom considers land as 
the property of the first occupier, while national regulation considers it to be the property of the 
state that can be given to foreign companies. This creates the core conflict between local cus-
tomary occupiers, artisanal miners, and licensed mining companies. Where there is a tradition 
of local artisanal mining, it has aggravated conflict over access to mineral resources. Changes 
in the accessibility of and rights to land through foreign direct investment have deep political 
implications where land is not simply an economic resource but also defines group member-
ship and social and political hierarchies. The question of access to the land and its resources 
thus engenders fundamental conflicts in mining zones.
Finally, multinational companies have a particularly negative effect on governance by govern-
ment in many states: they indirectly strengthen and reproduce unaccountable governments 
and cement political and social inequality in host societies. The rentier literature directs atten-
tion to such indirect effects of transnational mining companies on governance (e.g., Ross 1999). 
Governments in many cases still serve as the main gatekeeper between the domestic and the 
international spheres (Reno 2001; Bayart 2000). In spite of states’ overall weak capacities, gov-
ernments maintain the monopoly over symbolic capital and the legal authority to decide over 
mining rights. Figure 3 summarizes the dimensions and indicators for negative effects of non-
state governance practices that can be derived from the above review of literature. 
12 Interview with a member of ACORD (Agency for Cooperation and Research Development), April 8, 
2011, Mwanza, Tanzania.
13 Interview with a member of an NGO from Musoma (in North Mara region) working on mining areas, 
April 7, 2011, Mwanza, Tanzania.
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Figure 3
Negative externalities of core business practices
On perceived and actual (in)security
Direct: Increased violent encounters with 
security forces
Indirect: Increase in crime and “social 
disorder” due to in-migration, social change
On local and central state politics
Direct: Strengthen incumbents/some 
authorities over others, decrease 
accountability
Indirect: Increased competition and conflict 
within communities
4. The quality of governance in light of different collectivities 
The analytical categories introduced above for distinguishing between different qualities of lo-
cal governance contributions by companies point to different collectivities – those affected by 
core business practices, those subjected to the power of companies, those who ought to be ad-
dressed by governance, and those who are actually addressed and that receive business contri-
butions to collective goods. Our general point here is that there are different groups of people 
benefiting from and being negatively affected by business and business’ governance attempts in 
an area. Comparing these different collectivities allows for the evaluation of the quality of gov-
ernance contributions by companies. Such differentiation is necessary as there are huge differ-
ences between those defined by the company as addressees and those who actually benefit from 
a governance initiative. The difference becomes even more striking when one brings the col-
lectivity of those negatively affected by governance or by the private activities of the same actor 
– as compared to the reach of intentional governance initiatives – into the picture (see figure 4). 
Figure 4: Different collectivities of (non-)governance
A
B
C
D
A - Addressees of governance
B - Recipients of governance contributions
C - Those negatively affected by governance
D - Those affected by negative externalities, 
non-governance
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Who are these different groups of people? How large or small are they compared to each other, 
and what does this tell us about the quality of company governance? The case of gold-mining 
company Semafo in Guinea will serve again as an illustration (see summary in figure 5).14
In official reports on their CSR practices, the addressees of Semafo’s social programs and prac-
tices are very broad: they concern people from communities where they operate (Semafo 2008: 1). 
In practice, as we mentioned earlier, they address specific localities, namely Kiniero and Balan, 
which are both troublesome areas situated close to mining pits. However, within these villages, 
the actual recipients of Semafo’s support are specific groups of people strategically chosen: 
namely youth and the elders of the village. 
Who are the communities affected by Semafo’s CSR strategy, which falls under our definition of 
governance as an intentional attempt to provide collective goods? When looking at the negative 
effects of CSR in Semafo’s practices, we observed an unequal distribution of benefits. Money for 
community relations was used for maintenance of the sous-prefect’s car or inviting the prefect to 
the company facilities. In certain contexts, these practices “work” in that companies have local 
authorities on their side to calm down local tensions, as described above in the case of Barrick 
Gold in Tanzania. In the village of Kiniero in Guinea, the use of philanthropy as a cooptation 
strategy has had different consequences on local politics. It actually delegitimized those elders 
and village heads who accepted such donations. According to an interviewee, they were no lon-
ger seen as being impartial in their judgments because they accepted gifts from the compa-
ny.15 They were thus no longer perceived by the youth of the village and by others as credible 
authorities in matters concerning community-company relations. This has led to changes in 
power relations in the local community, giving authority to the youth to mobilize against the 
company. 
In terms of negative externalities of business practices, buying off of central authorities, invit-
ing them to stay in company facilities, giving them envelopes with cash, and taking care of fuel 
and fees contributes to unaccountable local governance structures. These authorities do not 
take the opportunity to meet their people in the surrounding villages. Externalities of these 
core business practices result in the downsizing of the central authorities’ accountability at the 
local level. This externality draws in yet another, even broader, subjected community compris-
ing all citizens at the local level. The environmental impact of gold mining in the area points to 
a similarly large group: everyone affected by dust and land degradation.
14 We will draw on preliminary findings from a pilot case study on Canadian gold-mining company 
Semafo in Upper Guinea conducted in the context of the SFB 700 research project “D2 Business and 
Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
15 Interviews with NGO members, journalists, and local people in Kouroussa and Siguiri District, Febru-
ary 2011, Guinea.
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Figure 5: Different collectivities of (non-)governance at Semafo Mining, Guinea
5. Conclusion 
This paper has set out to broaden the research agenda on business and governance. Two oppos-
ing views on business contributions to governance usually stand out in the literature. The busi-
ness and governance literature, and especially that on CSR, is mainly in the camp of those Avant 
et al. (2010: 358) refer to as looking for “virtuous cycles” of better collective goods provision and 
regulation for the public good. These authors take inspiration from John Ruggie (1998) and oth-
ers who argue that the participation of non-state actors in governance may increase the overall 
provision of collective goods. Others, however, have argued that instead “vicious cycles” toward 
overlapping and competing rules and non-governance, degrading accountability, and fragmen-
tation and exclusiveness of governance will prevail empirically (e.g., Cerny 1998). Non-state ac-
tors may thus eventually reduce overall collective goods provision because of the limited scope 
of their mandates and activities, and because of their negative effects on governance by states. 
Empirically, there is huge variation in what we find, and in fact evidence is available that sus-
tains both tendencies. Not all governors make broad claims about contributing to the collec-
tive good. Some may do so but actually benefit only a small group. Others openly work for the 
interests of a small group. Looking at different company sites in different developing countries, 
great differences in corporate governance practices, in the inclusiveness of corporate gover-
nance outcomes, and in the degree of negative effects of corporate core business practices can 
be observed. We have illustrated some of these observations in this paper.
Based on the observations above, we have therefore argued that the interesting question is not 
(or at least is no longer) whether companies do good or bad, contribute to governance or not. 
The paper emphasizes that we should also ask to what extent and for whom (see also Avant et al. 
2010: 365–66, who end on a similar note). From a focus on companies’ commitment to transna-
tional governance initiatives, and their compliance with these initiatives, governance research 
D
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B - Recipients of governance: 
youths and elders in Kiniero and Balan
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needs to systematically distinguish between different qualities of governance contributions by 
companies in terms of actual local outcomes and effects. The paper has proposed steps for how 
this could be done. Looking at the different scope of governance allows one to distinguish be-
tween who is addressed, who actually benefits, and who is left out (inclusiveness). Bringing the 
unintended effects of governance into view points to who loses out or is hurt by governance. 
Finally, we have added an analytical focus on who is hurt by core business practices, and thus 
the non-governance of negative externalities of company practices. These categories provide 
the basis for systematically describing different qualities of governance contributions by busi-
ness. Further research in the SFB 700 research project D2 applies this framework systematically 
to companies in different areas of limited statehood in sub-Saharan Africa in order to describe 
and explain different governance configurations and outcomes.
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